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The standard ad hoc monetary objective function creates a bias in favor of inflation targeting.  
Instead, this paper uses the Pareto criterion to assess inflation targeting (IT), price-level targeting 
(PLT), and nominal-income targeting (NIT).  The effect that unanticipated inflation or deflation 
benefits one party to a nominal contract while hurting the other party is an effect that cannot be 
captured in a model with a representative consumer or identical consumers.  To capture this 
effect, this paper analyses models with diverse consumers in a pure-exchange economy without 
storage.  When nominal aggregate demand (NAD) is stochastic but real aggregate supply (RAS) 
is not, PLT Pareto dominates IT.  This is because IT perpetuates price errors and hence nominal 
aggregate demand errors, while PLT tries to return to the original targeted price path.  By 
perpetuating these errors, IT perpetuates the welfare losses, whereas PLT corrects so to help 
reduce these welfare losses in the future.  When RAS is also stochastic, nominal contracts under 
NIT can lead to Pareto efficiency when consumers have average relative risk aversion, non-
stochastic endowment-to-RAS ratios, and no utility shocks.  Under the same assumptions IT and 
PLT lead to Pareto inefficiencies because they force the payers of nominal contracts to guarantee 
the real value of those payments to the receivers.  In essence this transfers RAS risk from the 
receivers of the nominal obligations to payers of the nominal obligations.  However, this transfer 
of risk would only be appropriate if all payers of nominal obligations had below average relative 
risk aversion and all receivers had above average relative risk aversion, a situation that rarely 
will hold. 
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Pareto Efficiency vs. the Ad Hoc Standard Monetary Objective 
An Analysis of Inflation Targeting 
 
  Several leading monetary economists have expressed the importance of macro and 
monetary economic analysis being based on rigorous and consistent microfoundations, general 
equilibrium analysis, and welfare analysis using the Pareto criterion.  For example, Sargent and 
Wallace (1975) described the IS-LM-NRPC model as an “ad hoc” model, which they considered 
“deplorable.” 
  While some movement has taken place toward microfoundations and welfare analysis 
with the Pareto criterion and away from ad hoc models, many macro/monetary economists still 
continue to perform ad hoc analysis.  This ad hoc analysis is most prevalent in the form of the ad 
hoc standard objective assumed for monetary policy. 
The ad hoc standard objective is to minimize the following function: 
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where  t p  and Yt are respectively the inflation rate and the level of real aggregate supply (RAS) 
at time t, 
*
t p  is the targeted inflation rate, 
P
t Y  is the potential level of aggregate output at time t, 
b  is the time discount factor of the policy makers, and l  is the weight between 0 and 1 on the 
squared deviation of inflation; 1-l  is the weight on the squared output gap. 
  The problems with ad hoc objective functions are well known in microeconomics.  An ad 
hoc objective function depends on the values of the researcher; they do not have a theoretical 
basis.  They also bias the conclusions or policy recommendations.  In particular, the monetary 
standard ad hoc objective function as applied to a model with flexible prices by assumption leads - 2 - 
to the conclusion that inflation targeting (IT) is better than price-level targeting (PLT).  However, 
if we replaced the actual and targeted inflation rates with the actual and targeted price levels, we 
then would conclude that price-level targeting is superior to inflation targeting.  Actually, 
Svenson’s (1999) definition of inflation targeting is in essence the use of the standard ad hoc 
objective function.  Clearly, the use of the standard ad hoc objective function cannot be the basis 
for determining whether inflation targeting or price-level targeting is better. 
  Microeconomics provides Pareto efficiency as an alternative to ad hoc goals and 
objectives.  A consumption allocation is Pareto efficient if there is no other feasible consumption 
allocation that makes at least one party better off without making anyone worse off.  Today, most 
rigorous microeconomic welfare analysis uses the Pareto criterion. 
  Welfare analysis involving the Pareto criterion has been used in much macroeconomic 
analysis since the Rational Expectations revolution.  Such analysis usually relies on 
microfoundations involving general equilibrium models.  However, usually these models assume 
either a representative consumer or identical consumers.  Nevertheless, most monetary 
economists consider the following to be one of the primary effects of monetary policy: 
Unanticipated inflation or deflation makes one party of a nominal bond or other nominal 
contract better off while making the other party worse off. 
 
However, such an effect cannot be captured by a representative consumer model or in a model 
with identical consumers.
1 
By including diverse consumers, this paper’s analysis does capture the different impacts 
of unanticipated inflation and deflation on different individuals.  The a priori effect of this 
impact on individuals is what leads this paper to its unique conclusions.  To simplify our 
analysis, we use flexible price models so that we need not worry about the tradeoff between 
                                                 
1 See Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991) for an example of the use of identical consumers. - 3 - 
inflation and output gap.  We find that PLT is Pareto superior to IT when long-term nominal 
contracts exist.  When consumers have the same relative risk aversion, we find that nominal 
income targeting (NIT) will Pareto dominate both PLT and IT. 
The next section, section II, reviews the Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics 
and discusses the importance of complete markets and the need for contracts to deal with 
“contingencies.”  In section III, we review an Arrow-Debreu economy with state-contingent 
securities to see how Pareto-efficient consumption varies with NAD (nominal aggregate 
demand) and with RAS.  Section IV studies IT and PLT when NAD is stochastic but RAS is not.  
Section V extends this analysis to when RAS is also stochastic and also considers NIT.  In 
section VI, we discuss what happens when consumers differ in their relative risk aversion, have 
stochastic endowment-to-RAS ratios, and experience utility shocks.  In section VII, we conclude 
and reflect upon this paper’s findings. 
II. Review of First Theorem of Welfare Economics and Complete Markets 
  The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics states that under rather general 
assumptions, any competitive equilibrium with complete markets is Pareto efficient.  If money in 
the economy is nondistortionary, this theorem indicates that there are three ways that monetary 
policy can help an economy move to Pareto efficiency: (1) move the economy towards more 
competition, (2) move the economy towards equilibrium, and (3) move the economy towards 
complete markets.  The analyses involving welfare improvements in economies with the Dixit-
Stiglitz (1977) model can be looked at as the first, reducing the welfare loss resulting from 
monopolistic competition.  Much of Keynesian economic recommendations to try to move the 
economy back to its full-employment level of output can be looked at as the second, moving the 
economy towards equilibrium. - 4 - 
  However, many economists do their analysis using flexible price models with 
competitive markets.  In competitive economies with flexible prices and nondistortionary 
money,
2 the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics indicates that the only way that 
monetary policy can help move the economy towards Pareto efficiency is to help complete 
markets.  This paper takes the role of monetary policy to help complete markets very seriously. 
To understand what complete markets means, we focus on the Arrow-Debreu economy, 
which is the economy that we most associate with complete markets.  Markets are completed in 
the Arrow-Debreu economy by state-contingent securities.  To help us understand how state-
contingent securities help complete markets, Figure 1 plots the payoff function of one particular 
state-contingent security.  Note 
that the state-contingent security 
pays iff one particular state-
contingent security occurs; if 
any other state of nature occurs, 
the holder of the security will 
receive nothing.  Figure 2 shows how we can combine many different state-contingent securities 
to obtain any payoff function one wishes to receive.  Note that the payoff function is dynamic; it 
is not static.  The payoff varies across state of nature; it does not remain constant.  By combining 
state-contingent securities, an individual can obtain a payoff function that will vary based on 
contingencies.  These state-contingent securities enable individuals to meet whatever 
contingency plan they decide is in their best interest; i.e., to maximize their utility functions. 
                                                 
2 If money  is distortionary, then monetary policy can effect Pareto improvements by reducing the distortionary 
effect of money. 
payment 
(consumption units) 
state of nature 
Figure 1: State-contingent security payoff function - 5 - 
In a pure-exchange economy without storage, Eagle (2005a and 2005b) shows that there 
is only one type of risk that cannot be diversified away.  This is the risk of RAS changing.  
Suppose we replace the state of nature on the horizontal axis in Figures 1 and 2 with RAS.  Then 
we would see that individuals would be able to buy state contingent securities to produce any 
payoff function of RAS that they would need to maximize their utility.  A major part of this 
payoff function should be concerned with how one’s Pareto-efficient consumption should vary 
with RAS.  Another factor relevant to macro and monetary economic theory is how Pareto-
efficient consumption should vary with changes in NAD.  The next section reviews Eagle’s 
(2005a and 2005b) conclusions concerning how Pareto-efficient consumption should vary with 
both NAD and RAS. 
payment 
(consumption units) 
state of  
nature 
Figure 2: Dynamic Contract Receipts from State-
contingent security payoff function - 6 - 
III. How PE Consumption Varies with NAD and RAS 
This section discusses how Pareto-efficient consumption should vary with NAD and RAS 
in a pure-exchange economy without storage.  Since Eagle (2005a and 2005b) discusses these 
issues, this section just reviews his results. 
In a pure exchange economy without storage but with risk-averse consumers, Eagle 
(2005b) proves the Consumption-Aggregate-Supply Invariance Property, which states that if 
there are no utility shocks and RAS stays the same, then an individual’s Pareto-efficient 
consumption must be the same.  He uses a proof by contradiction that is similar to proofs that 
insurance makes people better off.  If there are two states of nature where RAS is the same but 
the Pareto-efficient consumption allocation differs between the two states, then replacing the 
consumption in each of the two states with the average of the two state consumption allocations 
makes the risk-averse consumers better off without making anyone worse off.  This results in a 
Pareto Superior allocation, violating the assumption that the initial allocation was Pareto 
efficient. 
The Consumption-Aggregate-Supply Invariance Property has profound implications 
concerning monetary economic theory.  It implies that if NAD changes but RAS does not, then 
Pareto-efficient consumption should not change.  As mentioned at the beginning of the paper, 
one of the most important effects of monetary policy can be summarized in the following 
statement: 
Unanticipated inflation or deflation makes one party of a nominal bond or other nominal 
contract better off while making the other party worse off. 
 
Figure 3 explains how this effect is related to the need for PE consumption to be invariant to 
changes in NAD when RAS does not change.  Let 
E
t N  be the expected level of NAD at time t - 7 - 
when the two parties initially entered into their 
nominal contract.  Let  ) (
E
t jt N c  be individual 
j’s consumption if NAD at time t is as expected.  
Figure 3 shows that if NAD exceeds 
E
t N , then 
the receiver of a nominal obligation under the 
contract will be made worse off while the payer 
of the obligation will be made better off.  
Similarly, it shows that if NAD is less than 
expected, then the receiver of the nominal 
obligation is made better off, while the payer of 
the obligation is made worse off. 
To understand Figure 3, it is important to review the equation of exchange, which I 
would write as MV=N=PY.  Note that I insert N for NAD in the middle of this equation.  Note 
that while many economists describe the equation of exchange as a tautology, the right side of 
the equation is in fact an equilibrium condition, not a tautology. 
Take the right side of the equation of exchange, N=PY, and solve for P; we get P=N/Y.  
Under the assumption that Y (RAS) does not change, P will change only if N changes.  Again 
look at Figure 3.  If N increases, the price level increases, causing the real value of the nominal 
obligation to decrease.  This makes the payer better off and the receiver worse off.:  On the other 
hand, if N decreases, the price level decreases, increasing the real value of the nominal 
obligation, which will make the payer worse off and the receiver better off. 
Since both the payer and receiver are risk averse, both will be better off a prior if they 
were not exposed to this risk.  Thus, as shown in Figure 3, any Pareto-efficient consumption 
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Figure 3: Effects of Unexpected Changes in 
Nominal Aggregate Demand on the 
Consumption of Parties to Nominal 
Obligations 
N1 - 8 - 
allocation must have the property that 
both the payer’s and receiver’s 
consumption does not vary with NAD. 
In the next section we use Figure 3 
to show that PLT Pareto dominates IT 
when NAD is stochastic but RAS is not. 
IV. IT and PLT when NAD is 
Stochastic, but RAS is Not 
  This section begins our discussion of IT and PLT.  First, we explain the difference 
between IT and PLT.  Second, we apply the Consumption-Aggregate-Supply Invariance 
Property to evaluate IT and PLT under the Pareto criterion. 
  Figure 4 shows an example that illustrates the difference of IT and PLT.  On the vertical 
axis is the natural logarithm of the price level.   The initial targeted paths of IT and PLT are the 
same.  Assuming a constant desired inflation rate, this initial targeted path would be a straight 
line.  The difference between IT and PLT occurs when IT or PLT miss their targets.  Figure 4 
shows the scenario where the price level and hence the inflation rate exceed the targeted price 
level and targeted inflation rate at time 1.  Under PLT, the next period’s targeted price level does 
not change.  As a result, PLT tries to return to the original targeted path.  Under IT, the central 
bank’s response is to merely try to reach for its inflation targets for future periods.  As a result, 
the implied targeted price level under IT will be parallel to that under PLT.  In other words, 
under IT, the central bank changes its implied targeted price level, whereas with PLT, it does not. 
  An advantage of working with a flexible price model such as the competitive pure 
exchange model analyzed by Eagle (2005a and 2005b), is that it allows us to study IT and PLT 
new target under inflation 
targeting 
original targeted 
 price level under both 






Figure 4: Changes in Implicit Price Targets 
Under Inflation Targeting 
1  2 - 9 - 
without being concerned about output gap.  This is because in a flexible price model, output gap 
always equals zero. 
  Let us define the inflation rate as  1 / - º t t t P P p .  Then, the implied one-step-ahead price 
target under IT equals  1
*
- t t P p .  In other words, monetary policy will be set so that 
1
*
1 ] [ - - = t t t t P P E p .  By the (right side) of the equation of exchange, this implies that 
1 1
*
1 / ] / [ - - - = t t t t t t Y N Y N E p .  When RAS is known with certainty, we can rewrite this as: 
1 1
*
1 / ] [ - - - = t t t t t t Y Y N N E p   (1) 
Taking the expectations at time 0 of both sides, we get: 
1 1
*
0 / ] [ - - = t t t t t Y Y N N E p  





s t t Y Y N N E
1
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0 0 0 / ] [ p .  Let us 
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t Y Y N N E N p , we conclude that 




t Y Y N N .  Subtracting this latter equation from (1) gives: 
( ) 1 1 1
*




t t t Y Y N N N N E p  
Taking the expectation of both sides at some time s between 0 and t, we get: 
( ) 1 1 1
* / ] [ - - - - = - t t
E
t t s t
E
t t s Y Y N N E N N E p  
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1
* / ] [ p   (2) - 10 - 
Equation (2) shows that IT perpetuates the difference between actual nominal aggregate demand 
and the level of nominal aggregate demand expected when the parties initially entered into the  
contract. 
Now, let’s look at PLT where the central bank will adjust its monetary policy so that 
*
1 ] [ t t t P P E = - .  By the right side of the equation of exchange, N=PY, so P=N/Y.  Substituting this 
in gives 
* ] / [ t t t t P Y N E = .  If RAS (Yt) is known with certainty, we can then rewrite this as 
t t t t Y P N E
*
1 ] [ = - . By backwards recursion, we conclude that  t t t
E
t Y P N E N
*
0 ] [ = º .  We therefore 
conclude that 
E
t t t N N E = - ] [ 1   (3) 
Since equation (3) always applies under PLT when RAS is not stochastic, this implies that the 
expected NAD error under PLT is zero when RAS is not stochastic. 
Let’s now return to Figure 3 to evaluate IT and PLT under the Pareto criterion.  Let 
E
t N  
be the level of NAD the contract parties initially expected.  Next assume that NAD in the first 
period equals 
E N N 1 1 > .  As shown in Figure 3, when RAS does not change, this would increase 
the price level, decreasing the real value of the nominal obligation, making the payer of the 
nominal obligation better off and the receiver of the nominal obligation worse off.  By (2), IT 
would expect to maintain this NAD error.  In other words, it would attempt to maintain the payer 
being better off and the receiver worse off for future periods as well as the current period.  On 
the other hand, PLT would try to eliminate future NAD errors so that both the payer and the 
receiver will expect their real payments to be as they originally expected, that the expected future 
NAD would be as originally expected. - 11 - 
Similarly, if 
E N N 1 1 <  and RAS does not change, then the price level decreases, causing 
the real value of the nominal obligation to increase.  This makes the payer worse off and the 
receiver better off.  Again, IT would attempt to maintain this NAD discrepancy, causing the 
payer to expect to be worse off and the receiver to expect to be better off relative to their initial 
expectation not only for the current period but also for future periods.  With PLT, only in the 
current period would the payer be better off and the receiver worse off since PLT will attempt to 
return to NAD to its original targeted level. 
A priori both the payer and the receiver will be worse off with IT compared to PLT.  
With IT, the present value of their welfare losses over time will be much greater than under PLT 
since IT perpetuates NAD errors, whereas PLT corrects for them. 
The appendix presents a general equilibrium example to illustrate the welfare losses of IT 
compared to PLT.  The per capital RAS is 300 consumption units and consumers have identical 
logarithmic utility functions with a common time preference discount factor.  However, there are 
two types of consumers:  Type-A consumers receive a positive endowment at time 0 and no 
endowments thereafter.  Type-B consumers receive no endowment at time 0, but do receive a 
constant positive endowment thereafter. 
The only security that exists in the model is a perpetual bond.  We use a perpetual 
nominal bond because it is the extreme of a long-term nominal bond, but its mathematics are 
simpler than an annuity.  The nominal payments on this perpetual bond grow over time to 
counteract the erosion on the real value of the payments caused by a positive expected inflation 
rate.  Rather than disrupting the flow of the main body of this paper, most of the assumptions, 
model description, and analysis are put in the appendix.  The particular example assumed does 
result in a Pareto-efficient consumption allocation under perfect certainty. - 12 - 
 
Table I presents the results of the example in the appendix.  If prices are always on target, 
then the Pareto-efficient consumption allocation is achieved where all individuals consume 300 
units, resulting in utility each period of 5.70378 utils and a discounted sum of utility of 
234.36139 utils for each individual.  We then look at what happens if the price level at time 1 is 
2% greater than expected or 2% less than expected.  We assume that not only were these price 
errors unexpected, but the consumers did not anticipate even the possibility of these errors 
occurring. 
If the price level is 2% greater than expected, the type-A consumers, who had purchased 
the perpetual bonds will consume less because the higher price level reduces the real value of 
their nominal payments.  On the other hand, the type-B consumers will consume more since they 
had to pay less in real terms on the perpetual bonds they issued.  Thus, the type-A consumers are 
Price Level Targeting Inflation Targeting
prices on target
Type A consumers:
time cons. utility cons. utility cons. utility cons. utility cons. utility
0 300.00 5.70378 300.00 5.70378 300.00 5.70378 300.00 5.70378 300.00 5.7038
1 300.00 5.70378 294.12 5.68398 306.12 5.72399 294.12 5.68398 306.12 5.7240
t>1 300.00 5.70378 300.00 5.70378 300.00 5.70378 294.12 5.68398 306.12 5.7240
discounted sum 243.36139 243.34205 243.38111 242.53628 244.2032
average discounted utility 243.36158 average discounted utility 243.3697
expected utiltiy loss -0.00020 expected utiltiy loss -0.0083
Type B consumers: Price Level Targeting Inflation Targeting
time cons. utility cons. utility cons. utility cons. utility cons. utility
0 300.00 5.70378 300.00 5.70378 300.00 5.70378 300.00 5.70378 300 5.70378
1 300.00 5.70378 300.14 5.70425 299.85 5.70329 300.14 5.70425 299.85 5.70329
t>1 300.00 5.70378 300.00 5.70378 300.00 5.70378 300.14 5.70425 299.85 5.70329
discounted sum 243.36139 243.36185 243.36091 243.38099 243.3410
average discounted utility 243.36138 243.3610
expected utiltiy loss -0.00001 -0.00040
aggregated disc. utility loss -138.4749 aggregated disc. utility loss -5908.26
 + 2% Price Error  - 2% Price Error  + 2% Price Error  - 2% Price Error
 
Table I. Expected utility losses resulting from PLT and IT - 13 - 
hurt from this price-level increase, while the type-B consumers benefited.  This is true in period 
1 regardless whether the central bank targets the price level or inflation. 
If the price level is 2% less than expected, the type-A consumers will consume more 
because the lower price level increases the real value of their nominal payments.  On the other 
hand, the type-B consumers will consume less than they expected since they had to pay more in 
real terms on the perpetual bonds they issued.  Thus, the type-A consumers benefit and the 
type-B consumers are hurt from this price-level decrease. 
If the increase and decrease of the price levels at time 1 each occur with probability 0.5, 
then both the type-A and type-B consumers are made worse off in an expected sense as 
compared to the certainty of knowing the future prices. 
Under Price-Level-Targeting (PLT), the central bank will return the price levels for 
periods t>1 to their original price targets.  Thus, consumers only experience an expected utility 
loss in the first period.  (In the example in the appendix, the only unintentional price error that 
occurs is at time t=1.)  With IT, the central bank only tries to keep future inflation rates equal to 
the targeted inflation rates, which allows the price level to continue to either overshoot its target 
(for the +2% price error), or to continue to undershoot its target (for the –2% price error).  Thus, 
IT perpetuates the utility losses beyond period 1.  In a discounted sense the expected utility 
losses in this example are about 40 times greater with IT than with PLT. 
This section’s analysis assumed RAS did not change.  In the next section, we study how 
stochastic RAS changes the analysis. 
  - 14 - 
V. IT, PLT, and NIT when both NAD and RAS are Stochastic 
  In this section, we analyze what will happen when RAS is stochastic as well as NAD.  In 
addition to studying IT and PLT, we also study NIT.  We find that when all consumers have the 
same relative risk aversion, NIT should dominate IT and PLT. 
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means that an individual must decrease (increases) his/her consumption by 1% whenever RAS 
decreases (increases) by 1%.  Eagle(2005a) goes beyond this basic truism to show that in a pure-
exchange economy without storage, this same relationship needs to apply to any particular 
individual with average relative risk aversion.  (By this we mean the average of relative risk 
aversion across the whole economy.)  In other words, Eagle shows that the RAS elasticity of an 
individual’s PE consumption must equal one if that individual has average relative risk aversion. 
  Now let’s return to a nominal contract.  Let Ct be the nominal payment on that contract 
due at time t.  The real value of that payment will be Ct/Pt.  Since Pt=Nt/Yt by the equation of 
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.  In other words, under 
NIT, the RAS elasticity of the real value of a nominal payment under successful NIT is one, - 15 - 
which is also what the RAS elasticity of PE consumption is for someone who has average 
relative risk aversion.  Also, this is also the RAS elasticity of average consumption. 
  Now, let’s consider the RAS elasticity of the real value of a nominal payment under 
successful IT or PLT.  By successful PLT, we mean that the price level does end up equaling its 
target, i.e., 
*
t t P P = , for all t>0.  For successful IT, we mean that the inflation rate does end up 
equaling its target, i.e., 
*
t t p p = , for all t>0.  While such success is unlikely to be so perfect, 
analyzing how IT and PLT work under such perfect success is useful.  Note that under such 
perfect success, the implied price levels under PLT and IT will be the same.  Under such perfect 
success, the real value of nominal payments under IT and PLT will be nonstochastic, even if 
RAS is stochastic.  Thus the RAS elasticity of the real value of a nominal payment under 
successful IT or PLT will equal zero. 
  In a pure-exchange economy without storage; Eagle (2005b) shows that when (i) 
consumers have the same relative risk aversion, (ii) no utility shocks occur, and (iii) consumers’ 
endowments-to-RAS ratios are not stochastic; nominal bonds by themselves will complete 
markets when the central bank successfully targets nominal aggregate demand.   A very specific 
example of this is the perpetual nominal bond example in the appendix.  Even when RAS is 
stochastic in that example, successful NIT will result in a Pareto-efficient consumption 
allocation. 
 
VI. Differences in Relative Risk Aversion and Endowment and Utility shocks. 
  While nominal bonds under successful NIT will complete markets when all consumers 
have the same relative risk aversion, non-stochastic endowment-to-RAS ratios, and no utility - 16 - 
shocks can occur; changes in these assumption will mean that nominal bonds and NIT will need 
additional contracts to complete markets.  Eagle (2005b) shows that in a pure-exchange economy 
without storage, four types of contracts can approximately complete the markets.  Two of these 
contracts are insurance-like contracts that diversify away the risk individuals face when they face 
stochastic endowment-to-RAS ratios or utility shocks.  A third contract is a RAS risk- transfer 
(RASRT) contract, which is used to transfer risk from people with below average relative risk 
aversion to people with above average relative risk aversion. 
The fourth type contract Eagle (2005b) includes is what he calls a “normal contract,” 
which he defines as a contract with a real payment that is unaffected by changes in nominal 
aggregate demand and whose RAS elasticity equals one.  Two examples of such normal 
contracts are (i) nominal contracts under successful NIT, and (ii) Eagle and Domain’s (1995, 
2005a) quasi-real-indexed contracts. 
Let’s discuss IT, PLT, and NIT with regard to Eagle’s (2005b) analysis.  When there are 
no utility shocks and endowment-to-RAS ratios are not stochastic, then consumers with average 
relative risk aversion would only need normal contracts.  For such consumers, nominal contracts 
under successful NIT would be normal contracts.  However, under IT and PLT, nominal 
contracts would have a zero RAS elasticity and hence would not behave as normal contracts.  
Individuals could use RASRT contracts to combine with the nominal contracts to counter the 
effects of IT and PLT so to make the combination behave as normal contracts.  However, doing 
so would require all consumers, even consumers with average relative aversion to buy or sell 
RASRT contracts.  Under successful NIT, only consumers with above average or below average 
relative risk aversion need use RASRT contracts; consumers with average relative risk aversion 
would not need to use RASRT contracts.  Since many average consumers may be financially - 17 - 
unsophisticated, the average consumer may be unable to use RASRT contracts to counter the 
effects of IT and PLT. 
 
VII. Conclusions and Reflections 
  This paper discusses IT, PLT, and NIT in the context of a pure-exchange economy 
without storage but with flexible prices.  Doing so allows us ignore policy effects on output gap 
since no output gap exists in models with flexible prices.  This paper shows that PLT dominates 
IT when NAD is stochastic but RAS is not stochastic.  Because IT changes the targeted price 
levels as a result of missing its targets, IT perpetuates any utility losses.  On the other hand, 
because PLT does maintain the original future price targets even if the current price misses its 
target, future expected utility losses should be unaffected when the current price misses its target.  
As a result, the welfare losses from the current price missing its target are many times greater 
under IT than PLT. 
When RAS is also stochastic and consumers have the same relative risk aversion, then 
NIT should Pareto dominate IT and PLT when nominal contracts exist.  This is because the RAS 
elasticity of the real payments on nominal contracts equals one under NIT.  This RAS elasticity 
of one is exactly what is needed for Pareto-efficient consumption for individuals with average 
relative risk aversion.  It is also what is needed for consumption on average over all consumers.  
However, if consumers face utility shocks or stochastic endowment-to-RAS ratios; they will also 
need insurance-like contracts to diversify away their risks concerning the endowment-to-RAS 
ratios and any utility shocks they may face. 
Under NIT, consumers with average relative risk aversion will not need to use RASRT 
contracts, but under PLT or IT, they will need to use the RASRT contracts to undo the effects of - 18 - 
PLT or IT.  If the average consumer is financially unsophisticated, they would be able to achieve 
their Pareto-efficient consumption easier under NIT than under PLT or IT. 
By dealing with diverse consumers, this paper captured the effect that unanticipated 
inflation or deflation makes one party of a nominal contract better off while making the other 
part worse off.  On an a priori basis, both parties are better off if they are not exposed to the risk 
of unanticipated inflation or deflation if that risk is caused by stochastic NAD.  However, if that 
unanticipated inflation or deflation is caused by stochastic RAS, then the resulting effects on the 
real value of the nominal payments are just as is required for consumers with average relative 
risk aversion and is also what is required on average across the whole economy. 
Under IT and PLT, the central bank is trying to make the price level so that it will not 
react to changes in RAS.  However, that means the payer of a nominal payment is guaranteeing a 
constant real payment no matter what the level of RAS.  If RAS drops, the issue of a nominal 
payment must then on average decrease his/her consumption more than proportional to the drop 
in RAS so that the receiver of the payment will be immune to the changes in RAS.  In essence, 
IT and PLT make all payers of nominal obligations provide guarantees or insurance to the 
receivers of those nominal obligations.  However, the only justification for doing this would be 
to assume that all payers of nominal obligations have less than average relative risk aversion and 
all receivers of nominal obligations have above average relative risk aversion.  Nevertheless, 
there is no reason to assume that payers and receivers of nominal obligations have different 
levels of relative risk aversion.  Under successful NIT, the real value of the nominal obligations 
have a RAS elasticity of one, which means that the payers and receivers of the obligations will 
proportionately share in the changes in RAS.  Such sharing in the changes in RAS is appropriate 
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Appendix A 
 
This appendix presents the assumptions and analysis of the example involving the 
perpetual bond discussed in the paper.  Define 
*
1
* * / - º t t t P P p .  Assume that 
* * p p = t  for t=1,2,… 
.   1
* - =p g  







t c b   (4) 
where b  is the consumers’ time discount factor and cjt is individual j’s consumption at time t. 
The only security that exists in this economy is a perpetual bond, whose payment grows over 
time.  Let  j z  be the number of perpetual bonds that individual j demands at time 0.  The 
payment on these bonds at time will equal  ( ) r g z
t
j + 1  where g is the growth rate of the payments 
each period and r is the after-growth return.  If the growth rate equals the expected inflation rate, 
we can think about r as being a real interest rate.  We will make this assumption.  However, we 
will assume g is specified in the perpetuity contract, not indexed to the inflation rate.  As a result, 
unanticipated inflation or deflation will still impact both parties to the perpetuity. 
Let Pt be the price level at time t.  Also, let kjt be the portion of RAS that j receives at 
time t.  Since the only available security is the growing perpetual bond, individual j’s budget 
constraint at time 0 is: 
0 0 0 0 0 Y k P z c P j j j = +   (5) 
This states that the value of j’s consumption at time 0 plus his/her demand for perpetual bonds 
equals the value of j’s endowment at time 0. 
Individual j’s budget constraint at time t is: - 21 - 
( ) r g z Y k P c P
t
j t jt t jt t + + = 1 0   (6) 
This states that the value of j’s consumption at time t equals the value of j’s endowment plus the 
nominal payment j receives on his/her perpetual bonds. 
Each individual j will maximize (4) subject to (5) and (6).  The first order necessary 














  (7) 
  We look at a special case where the resulting consumption allocation is Pareto efficient.  
We also assume that the time discount factor b =125/128 and the number of consumers 
m=10,000,000.  Of these 10,000,000 consumers; 234,375 are type-A each of whom receive an 
endowment of 12,800 consumption units at time 0 and none therefore.  The remaining 9,765,625 
are type-B individuals, each of whom receives no endowment at time 0 but does receive an 
endowment of 307.2 consumption units for times t=1,2,…  These assumptions imply that the 
RAS in each period is 3 billion units, and the per capita RAS is 300 units.  We assume the 
targeted inflation rate is 2% each period, so that 
*
1
* * / - º t t t P P p =1.02.  We also assume that the 
growth rate g of the perpetual bond is also 2%.  The perpetual bond’s “real” interest rate that will 
clear markets under these assumptions equals 2.4%.  Each type-A individual, who receives an 
endowment of 12,800 units at time 0 and no endowments thereafter, will buy 12,500 perpetual 
bonds.  Each type-B individual, who receives no endowment at time 0, but an endowment of 
307.2 units for each period thereafter, will issue 300 perpetual bonds. That the bond market 
clears is shown by 12,500(234,375)-300(9,765,625)=0. - 22 - 
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t r b , which can be rewritten as 
b b / ) 1 ( - = r .  Replacing b  with its value of 125/128 confirms that r should equal 2.4%.  Since 
consumption per capita equals RAS per capital, the goods market also clears.  (Note: a 
spreadsheet is available from the author showing these calculations and the calculations that 
follow.) 
This solution is valid under perfect certainty.  The value of (5) for each consumer will be 
243.3614 utils as shown in Table I in the main body of the paper.  While we will continue to 
assume that consumers assumed perfect certainty when they maximized (5) subject to (6) and 
(7), let us now assume that in period 1, a mistake occurs.  Not only are we assuming that this 
mistake was unexpected, but we are assuming consumers did not anticipate even the possibility 
of this error (otherwise the consumption optimization problem we specified would be much more 
complicated).  Nevertheless, we can still discuss the welfare implications occurring as a result of 
this error. 
We actually consider two errors: First that the price level at time 1 is 2% higher than 
expected and second that it is 2% lower than expected.  We then average the two to determine 
the expected utility loss for each individual as a result of these errors occurring each with 
probability 0.5.  These results are presented in Table I and discussed in the text. 